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Preface 
The research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics at  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments that  are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
to generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - at  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The central purpose is to  develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is that such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid to the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to  address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts7 concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography' of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition to  empirical work at  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance at  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that  
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that  successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought to address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that needed to be explained. 
The list of these 'facts7 is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal - all the way to the evidence regarding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project 
is that  the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant to pursue an 'evolutionary' interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tions learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection7 by which inter- 
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active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently a t  IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
1 Introduction 
There are a t  least two complementary ways to  present the ideas which follow. One is with 
reference to  some "grand" questions that have faced social sciences since their inceptions, namely, 
how do institutions shape the behaviour of individual agents, within and outside the economic 
arena? And what are institutions in the first place? How do they come about and how do they 
change? What are the relationships between 'agency' and structure? And also, nearer economic 
concerns, what is the role of institutions in economic coordination and change? 
Another, more modest, way of tackling some of these grand issues is to see how this is done 
in practice by different research programmes which nonetheless share a common preoccupation 
to  understand economic change as a historical, institutionally embedded, process. 
This is what we shall attempt to  do in this work, by discussing the links, overlapping, tensions 
and possible interbreedings between an emerging evolutionary theory of economic dynamics and 
various strands of institutionalist theories, with particular attention to  the Regulation approach. 
Some definitions are in order of what we mean by those terms and of where we put the 
boundaries of different theories. This shall be done, albeit in a rather telegraphic fashion, in 
sections 2-4. I11 Section 5 we sketch, as an illustration, the interpretations of growth process 
in general, and in particular, the case - very familiar to institutionalist macroeconomists - of 
the so-called "Fordist" phase of development experienced by Western Countries after World 
War 11, and assess the different "styles" of explanation of evolutionary and Regulation theories, 
respectively. In turn, these differences in "style" partly hide different levels of observation - 
hence, probably entailing fruitful complementarities - and partly also reveal genuine differences 
in the choice of explanatory variables and causal relationships. We shall discuss some of these 
issues with respect to the nature of institutions and behavioural microfoundations (Section 6). 
Finally, we propose a sort of taxonomy of potentially complementary levels of descriptions and 
analytical methodologies and, together, we suggest some items that in our view are high on both 
evolutionist and institutionalist research agendas (Section 7). 
2 Evolutionary Theories: Some Definitions 
For the purposes of this work let us restrict our discussion to evolutionary theories of economic 
change. In brief, a sort of 'archetypical' evolutionary model possesses, in our view, the following 
characteristics (much more detailed discussions of the state-of-the-art are in Hogson (1993), Dosi 
and Nelson (1994), Nelson (1995), Silverberg and Verspagen (1995)). 
1. As Sidney. Winter uses to  summarize it,  the methodological imperative is dynamics first!!. 
That  is, the explanation t o  why something exists intimately rests on how it became what 
it is. Or putting it in terms of negative prescriptions: never take as a good 'explanation' 
either an existence theorem or a purely functionalist claim (entity x exists because it 
performs function y . . .). 
2. Theories are explicitly microfounded, in the sense that they must involve or a t  least be 
consistent with a story of what agents do and why they do it.' 
3. Agents have a t  best an imperfect understanding of the environment they live in, and, even 
more so, of what the future will deliver. Hence, "bounded rationality" in a very broad 
sense is generally assumed. 
4. Imperfect understanding and imperfect, path-dependent, learning entails persistent het- 
erogeneity among agents, even when facing identical information and identical notional 
opportunities. 
5. Agents are always capable of discovering new technologies, new behavioural patterns, new 
organisational set-ups. Hence, also the continuous appearance of various forms of novelty 
in the system. 
6. Relatedly, while (imperfect) adaptation and discovery generate variety (possibly in seem- 
ingly random fashions), collective interactions within and outside markets, perform as 
selection mechanisms, yielding also differential growth (and possibly also disappearance) 
of different enti ties which are so to speak 'carriers' of diverse technologies, routines, strate- 
gies, etc. 
7. As a result of all this, aggregate phenomena (e.g. regularities in the growth process or in 
industrial structures, etc.) are "explained" as emergent properties. They are the collective 
outcome of far-from-equilibrium interactions and heterogeneous learning. Finally they 
often have a metastable nature, in the sense that  while persistent on a time scale longer 
than the processes generating them, tend to  disappear with probability one.' 
'Note, however, that there are a few 'aggregate' (i.e. non-microfounded) models which are nonetheless 'evolu- 
tionary' in spirit (for a survey, Silverberg and Verspagen (1995)). 
'On the notions of "emergence" and "metastability" cf. the discussion in Lane (1993). 
This is not the place to review the growing number of contributions which share some or 
all of these seven broad methodological building blocks3. 
Suffice to  mention, first, the flourishing number of formal models and historical interpreta- 
tions of economic growth as an evolutionary process propelled by technical change which 
have followed the seminal work of Nelson and Winter (1982). (See among others Dosi, 
Freeman, Nelson, Silverberg and Soete (1988), Day and Eliasson (1986), Silverberg and 
Verspagen (1994), Conlisk (1989), Chiaromonte and Dosi (1993), Silverberg and Soete 
(1993) and the discussion in Nelson (1995) and Silverberg and Verspagen (1995)). 
Second, the diffusion of innovations has been fruitfully analysed, from different angles, 
as an evolutionary path-dependent process (cf. among others David (1985) and (1992)) 
Silverberg et a1 (1988), Arthur, Ermoliev and Kaniovski (1987)) Nakicenovic and Griibler 
(1992), Metcalfe (1992)). 
Third, the very development of an evolutionary perspective has been deeply intertwined 
with the historical analysis of the processes by which technical change is generated, ranging 
from the microeconomic level all the way to  'national systems of innovation7 (within an  
enormous literature, see Freeman (1982), David (1975), Rosenberg (1976) and (1982), 
Basalla (1988), Mokyr (1990)) Granstrand (1994), Vincenti (1990), Nelson (1992)) and the 
reviews in Dosi (1988) and Freeman (1994)). 
Fourth, a growing number of industrial case studies and models of industrial change fits 
quite well the evolutionary conjectures outlined above (again, just as examples, see Pavitt 
(1984), Utterback and Suarez (1992)) Klepper (1993), Malerba and Orsenigo (1994), Win- 
ter (1984), Dosi et al. (1995)). 
Fifth, one is starting t o  explore learning itself as an evolutionary process a t  the levels 
of both individuals and organisations (limiting ourselves to  economic applications, see 
Marengo (1992), hlarengo and Tordjman (1995), Lindgren (1992)) Dosi et al. (1994)) 
Levinthal (1990)) Warglien (1995), Palmer et al. (1994)). This links also with a wide 
tradition of studies in the fields of organisational economics which is impossible t o  review 
here (but see the remarks in Winter (1986) and (1995)). 
Finally, there is a good overlapping between the evolutionary perspective - a,s we have 
defined it - a,nd various types of "self-organisation" models (see Lesourne (1991)), and 
3Note tha t ,  given the  above quite broad definition of the  'evolutionary research programme', it may well 
describe also the  contributions of authors who would not call themselves 'evolutionist' in any strict  sense. 
also with the expanding field of evolutionary games (see for example Young (1993), Kan- 
dori, Mailath and Rob (1993), and Kaniovski and Young (1994)). Short of any detailed 
discussion of analogies and differences (which will be briefly recalled below), let us just 
mention that  certainly they have in common the emphasis on dynamics (point 1 above) 
and bounded rationality assumptions (point 3), but much less so the role of novelty (point 
5) and the focus on non-equilibrium, finite time, properties (point 7)4 
So, yes: indeed, we do have a rich and growing body of economic literature which a t  last 
tackles change and evolution, whereby increasing returns are the norm rather than the exception 
(and, with that ,  also the possibility of 'lock-ins'), history counts, and agents are presumed to  be 
less than perfectly rational and knowledgeable. But where do institutions fit in this picture? 
Let us now turn to  this issue. 
3 Inst it ut ions and Evolution 
Again, for the sake of clarity, starting with some definitions helps. 
Here we use the term "institution" with a broad meaning to include 
a )  formal organisations (ranging from firms to technical societies, trade unions, universities, 
all the way to  Sta,te Agencies); 
b) patterns of behaviours that  are collectively shared (from routines to social conventions to  
et'hical codes); 
c) negative norms and constraints (from moral prescriptions to formal laws). 
Distinctions between the three sub-categories will be made in the following when necessary. 
The proposition that  in sense "institutions count" in shaping economic coordination and 
change is certainly shared by all breeds of "evolutionists" mentioned earlier with various strands 
of 'neo-institutionalists' (see for example Williamson (1985) and (1995), and North (1990) and 
(1991)), and also, of course, with "old" institutionalism (drawing back to  Veblen, Commons, 
etc.). But, clearly, the tricky issue is i n  which sense do they count. 
Simplifying t o  the extreme, two archetypical, opposing views can be found in all these litera- 
ture. At one end of the spectrum, the role of institutions can be seen as that  of (i) parameterizing 
the environmental state variables (say the comparative costs of markets, hybrids and hierarchies 
*To repeat, this is not meant to  be any thorough review but just an approximate roadmap. Moreover, a t  least 
a partial overlapping with the 'evolutionary archetype' can be found in quite diverse fields of economic theory: 
see for example M. Aoki (1995) and Stiglitz (1992). 
in Williamson or, nearer to  evolutionary concerns, technological opportunities and appropriabil- 
ity conditions); and (ii) constraining the menus of actions available to the agents (which in some 
game-theoretic versions reduces to "the rules of the game"). Conversely, a t  the opposite and, let 
us put under the heading of embeddedness view all those theories which claim, in different fash- 
ions, that  institutions do not only 'parameterize7 and 'constrain7, but given any one environment, 
also shape the 'visions of the world7; the interaction networks; the behavioural patterns; and, 
ultimately, the very identity of the agents. (In the contemporary literature, under this heading 
come e.g. Granovetter (1985) and (1995), and also March and Olsen (1989), DiMaggio and 
Powell (1991), just to  name a few, and has a close relative in 'cultural theory7: cf. Schwartz and 
Thompson (1990) and Grendstad and Jelle (1995)). Note that  where a theory is placed along 
this spectrum has significant implications in terms of the predictions that  it makes with respect 
to  the collective outcomes of interactions and to  the directions of change. On the grounds of the 
former view, the knowledge (by the analyst) of the (institutionally shaped) system parameters 
is sufficient to  determine the collective outcomes (precisely, under "perfect" rationality - with 
the caveat of multiple equilibria -; and approximately under "bounded" rationality). Conversely, 
the embeddedness view implies that  in order to understand "what happens" and the directions 
of change over time much richer institutional details are needed. (First of all, one is likely to 
require to  know much more about the multiple institutions of which the agents are part,  and 
also much more of their histories . . .). 
As discussed at  greater length in Dosi (1995), three other dichotomies are relevant here. 
One concerns the origin of the institutions. Briefly put, are institutions themselves a primitive 
of the theory or is self-seeking rationality the primitive and institutions are a derived concept? 
Under the latter view, whatever institution one observes, one has to justify it ,  asking the question 
how self-seeking agents have come to  build it (with an answer that  could be either via forward 
looking rationality or myopic adaptation . . .) .  Conversely, under the former view, the existence 
of an institution is "explained" relying much more heavily on the institutions that  preceeded 
it and the mechanisms which led to  the transition. Relatedly, one is also entitled to ask why 
do people embedded in certain institutions behave the way they do (i.e. how institutions shape 
their specific "rationality" and equally specific perceptions of their interests.) 
Another dichotomy regards the degrees of intentionality of institutional constructions, that  
is, are they purposefully built according to some sort of collective constitutional activity or, 
conversely, are they mainly the outcome of an unintentional self-organisation processes/(point 
7) ? 
Table ,1. Weak and Strong Varieties of Institutionalism. 
"Weak" "Strong" 
Institutionalism Institutionalism 
1) Role of institutions Parameterize system variables; Also "embed" cognitive and 
constrain menu of strategies behavioural patterns; shape 
identities of actors 
2) "Primitives" of the (Perfectly or boundedly) Illstitutions as "primitives"; 
theory rational self-seeking agents; forms of "rationality" and 
institutions as derived entities perceptions of self-interest as 
derived entities 
3) Mechanisms of Mainly intentional, Mainly unintentional 
insti tution-formulation "constitutional", processes self-organization processes 
4) Efficiency properties Institutions perform useful Institutions as "carriers of 
functions; may be considered history"; reproduces 
equilibria in some selection path-dependently, often 
space irrespectively of this 
functional efficiency 
A final dichotomy concerns the efficiency properties (and the equilibrium nature) of institu- 
tions themselves. Do they exist because they "perform a function" and, thus, are the equilibrium 
outcome of some process that  selected in favour of that function? Or conversely paraphrasing 
Paul David (1994) are they mainly "carriers of history", in the sense that they tend to path- 
depelldelltly reproduce themselves well-beyond the time of their usefulness (if they ever had 
one)? 
The four dichotomies toget her define the distance between any one institutionalist view 
and the standard "neoclassical" paradigm (institution-free, with perfectly rational agents, well- 
formed and invariant preferences, etc.). As shown in Table 1, one may identify different grada- 
t ions of institutionalism, ranging from weak forms - retaining a lot of the canonic microfounda- 
tions - to strong forms - wherein institutions have much more life of their own and also much 
more influence on what microentities think and do. 
How does the evolutionary research programme (as we have defined it) relate to  the various 
strands of institutionalism, if it does at  all? It is our view that the links are indeed profound (the 
famous plea for an evolutionary approach to  economic analysis by one of the founding figures of 
institutionalism, T .  Veblen (1898), is a historical symbol of this intuitive relationship). However, 
it seems to us also true that the linkages so faa still are to a large extent implicit. 
Certainly, there are a lot of institutional assumptions in evolutionary reasoning. So, for 
example, it is quite natural to assume that the particular behavioural rules, interaction mecha- 
nisms and learning patterns that one finds in evolutionary models are embedded into particular 
institutions. In fact, markets themselves are viewed as specific, history-contingent, institutions. 
Moreover, it is straightforward that routines - which play a prominent role in evolutionary 
theorizing of economic behaviours - are shaped by the history of the organisations in which they 
have developed and also by a broader institutional history. (For example, one is quite a t  ease 
with the idea that  the routines and strategies of e.g. a firm from Victorian Manchester are likely 
to be quite different from those of American multidivisional corporations analyzed by Alfred 
Chandler; that  differences in the institutional contexts contribute to explain the behavioural 
differences between contemporary Japanese, American, and European firms, etc.). 
Finally, a lot of effort has gone into the understanding of the specificities of the institu- 
tions supporting technological change (cf. for example, Nelson (1993), Lundvall (1992) and the 
chapters by Nelson and Freeman in Dosi et al. (1988)). 
However, it is fair to  say that  the institutional embeddedness of technological opportunities, 
routines, forms of market interactions and selection mechanisms, etc. while abundantly acknowl- 
edged, has received little attention on its own (with the mentioned exception of those institutions 
more directly linked with innovative activities and notwithstanding the suggestions in Lundvall 
(1992) aiming to  provide a broader institutional meaning to the notion of 'national systems of 
innovation'). So, for example, one is still lacking any systematic mapping between classes of 
institutional arrangements of the economy and classes of interaction mechanisms/adjustment 
rules that  one finds in evolutionary theories. As a consequence, one is equally still unable to 
map iilstitutional a.rrangements into particular dynamic properties of aggregate variables - say 
incoille and productivity growth, employment, etc.. (See, however, Chiaromonte et a1 (1992) for 
an initial, still quite preliminary attempt.) Conversely, these types of mapping are precisely the 
starting point of "strong" institutionalist approaches as defined above. As a term of comparison, 
let us consider in particular the "Regulation" school. 
4 An Institutionalist View of the Economic System: 
The "Regulation" Approach 
For those who are not familiar with this tradition of studies, which originally developed in 
France (see Aglietta (1982), Boyer and Mistral (1978), Boyer (1987), (1988a-b), and (1990), 
Coriat (1994), Jessop (1989), Boyer and Saillard (1995)). First note that  by regulation - in 
French - one does not mean the legal regulatory apparatus as understood by the same term 
in English. Rather, its meaning is nearer the notion from system theory of different parts 
or processes that  under certain conditions reciprocally adjust yielding some orderly dynamics. 
Hence, regulation stands for the relatively coherent socio-economic tuning of any one economic 
system, and different regimes of regulation capture the specificities in the "mechanisms and 
principles of adjustment associated with a configuration of wage relations, competition, State 
interventions and hierarchisation of the international economy" (Boyer 1987, p. 127). 
In this perspective, and unlike evolutionary models, the description of the system is imme- 
diately institutional and taxonomic, attempting to identify some sort of archetypical structural 
forms which distinguish alternative socio-economic  regime^.^ 
For our purposes here, let us define different regimes of accumulation in terms of the insti- 
tutional arrangements concerning six domains, namely: 
1. The wage-labour nexus. Under this heading come the nature of the social division of 
labour; the type of employment and the mechanism of governance of industrial conflict; 
the existence and nature of union representation; the systems of wage formation; etc. 
2. The forms of competition in the product markets (whether nearly-competitive or 
oligopolist; the related mechanism of price formation; etc.) 
3. The iilstitutions governing financial markets and monetary management (including the re- 
lationships between banks and industry, the role of stock exchanges in industrial financing; 
the lnechanisms of liquidity creation in the system; etc.). 
4. The norms of consumption (i.e. the composition and changes in the baskets of consumption 
and their differences across social groups). 
5 .  The forms of State intervention in the economy (e.g. monetary and fiscal policies; "State 
as arbiter" vs. State as an  active player with respect to social conflict, income distribution, 
welfare; etc.). 
6. The organisation of the international system of exchanges (e.g. the rules of international 
tra,de; the presencelabsence of a single hegemonic power; the patterns of specialization; 
etc.). 
The identification of discrete regimes implies then a sort of combinatorial exercise among 
these six doma.ins; the historically-informed identification of dominant ones in particular periods; 
5A related perspective, which is not possible to  discuss here, persued especially by "radical" American 
economists is known as the theory of "Social Structures of Accumulation". See for example Bowles and Gin- 
tis (1993) and the references therein. 
the assessment of the conditions of their viability and eventual crises; the specific realizations of 
a dominant regime in different countries. So a lot of work has been done in order to  identify the 
nature of the "classical" (or "competitive") regime which ran through most of last century, as 
opposed to  a "Fordist" (or "monopolistic") regime coming to  maturity in the developed West 
after World Wa.r I1 (cf. Aglietta (1982)) Boyer and Mistral (1978) and the works reviewed 
in Boyer and Saillard (1995)). The focus of the analysis is to  a good extent the long-term, 
influenced by Marxism and the French historical tradition of the Annales, and the emphasis 
is macroinstitutional: it is centered, for example, on the institutions governing "social com- 
promises" among major social groups (Delorme and Andr6 (1983), Coriat (1982) and (1990))) 
educational iilstitutions (Caroli (1995)), financial institutions, etc. 
One could say that  the Regulation approach is an ambitious attempt - paraphrasing John 
Hicks - t o  develop a "theory of contemporary history". It has proved indeed to  be a very rich 
source of heuristics and categories for historical analyses and comparative studies ( a  thorough 
survey of the state-of-the-art is in Boyer and Saillard (1995)). But there are also a few exercises 
of formalizatioil of sorts of reduced forms of the theory whereby the (institutionally-shaped) 
regularities in the above six domains are summarized by some functional relations linking ag- 
gregate variables (e.g. wages with prices, productivity and employment; productivity growth 
with the growth of output, investments and R&D; output growth with investment and exports. 
See in particular Boyer (1988b) and the contributions by Billandot, Juillard and Amable in 
Boyer and Saillard (1995)). The models have a strong Keynesian/Kaldorian ascendency, but 
certainly expand upon the ancestors, and, more important, attempt to  capture the differences 
across regimes in terms of different parametrizations and functional specifications of those ag- 
gregate relationships (e.g. do wages depend mainly on unemployment, as in the "competitive" 
regime, or are they basically linked t o  consumer prices and productivity, as in the "Fordist" 
regime? Does some sort of 'Verdoorn-Kaldor law' apply t o  productivity growth? How sensitive 
are investments to  profits as opposed to  'accelerator' effects? etc.). In these reduced forms, 
the stability of 'regimes' is investigated in terms of the existence of stable steady states engen- 
dered by particular ranges of parameters. Moreover, by specifying dynamic couplings across 
these same aggregate variables one is able to  identify quite rich long-term patterns including 
bifurcations (Lordon (1994)) and phase transitions. 
At this point, readers not too familiar with both the evolutionary and the regulation ap- 
proaches might reasonably wonder what they have in common. Prima facie, they do indeed 
share some methodological commitment t o  the understanding of dynamic patterns which do 
not simply involve "more of the same". They both also depart from the canonic view of the 
economy of a "naturally" self-regulating system. Moreover, their microfoundations (explicit in 
most 'evolutionary' contributions, implicit in most of the 'regulationist' ones) imply much less 
than perfect rationality and foresight. And, finally they share a deep commitment to  the idea 
that  'institutions matter'. But what else beyond that? Are they talking about the same objects 
of analysis? And, when they do, how do their interpretations overlap or diverge? In order to  
clarify these issues for the discussion, let us briefly check the two perspectives against an object 
of inquiry that  both have abundantly addressed, namely growth and in particular the observed 
post-World War I1 patterns. 
5 Some Different Theoretical Stories on Growth, in general, 
and the Post-War Period, in particular . . . 
It is revealing to  compare the barebones of the interpretative stories that  'evolutionists7 and 
'regulationists7 would be inclined to  put forward about the basics of the growth process, were 
they forced to  summarize them in few sentences. 
Most likely, the story provided within an evolutionary perspective would start with a multi- 
tude of firms searching for more efficient techniques of production and better performing prod- 
ucts, and competing in the markets for products and finance. Differential success in search, 
together with different behavioural rules and strategies (concerning e.g. pricing, investment, 
etc.) would then determine their differential revealed performances (in terms of e.g. their prof- 
itability, market shares, or survival probabilities) and hence their ability to growth in the next 
"period". Aggregate growth, in this view, is essentially driven by technological advances. Re- 
latedly, the eye of the analyst is naturally led to look for the origins, nature and accessability 
of technological opportunities; the easiness by which firms can imitate each other (i.e. appro- 
priability conditions); the ways firms are able to store and augment their knowledge (i.e. the 
relationships between organisational routines and competences); and finally the mechanisms and 
speed of market selection. 
As already emphasized, such an evolutionary story is comfortable with complementary insti- 
tutional fa,ctors. Most straightforwardly, for example, it is consistent with (and indeed demands) 
an institutionally-grounded explanation of the mechanisms of generation of 'opportunities' to 
be tapped by private agents; of the legal framework contributing to shape appropriability condi- 
tions; of the origins of particular sets of corporate routines; of the nature of market interactions; 
of the ways wages react t o  the changes in the demand for labour induced by technical change 
and growth; etc. 
However, compare this story with the much more directly institution-based story within a 
Reguhtion perspective. In the latter, plausibly, the starting point would be an analysis of the 
factors which render a particular regime of a,ccumulation viable (note incidentally that  while 
it was possible to  tell a caricature of an evolutionary story of capitalist growth in genera.1, 
here one needs from the start history-contingent specifications). One part of the story would 
concern the institutions governing wage formation, the labour process and income distribution 
- determining labour productivity and the surplus available for investment. Another part of the 
story would focus on the mechanisms of generation of aggregate demand (including the ways 
income distribution and social institutions affect the composition and dynamics of consumption 
baskets). Yes another part would address the ways the State intervenes into the economy (Is 
it a "Keynesiann/Welfare State or is it a Laisser-Faire one?, etc.) Moreover, one would look 
at  the ways products and financial markets are organized. In a nutshell, the answer to the 
questioil of "what drives growth" is found in the consistency conditions among those major 
pieces of iilstitutional organisation of the socio-economic fabric. Hence, consistent matching 
foster sustained growth, while mismatching engenders instability, crises and macroeconomic 
depression. 
Having focused, in primis, on the institutional features of the system, the approach - in 
nmnners somewhat symmetrically opposite to the 'evolutionary' interpretation - is complemen- 
tary to detailed specifications of the patterns of technological change. For example, it easily 
ackilowledged that  technological innovation is a major determinant of the division of labour and 
work organisation; of the importance of economics of scale (and thus of the aggregate relation- 
ships between productivity growth and income growth); of demand patterns; of international 
competitiveness; etc. IEowever, it is fair to say that  what appears as the major driver of growth 
in the evolutionary account, here (in the Regulation approach) tends to feature more in the back- 
ground among the necessary or constraining conditions for growth, while the opposite applies 
to  the thread of country-specific and period-specific institutions. 
A similar difference (which might be just a matter of emphasis or might be much more; see 
below) emerges when handling the interpretation of specific historical circumstances. Compare, 
as an illustration Nelson and Wright (1992) and Aglietta (1982) on American performances in 
this century (notwithstanding the only partial overlapping between the two, with the former 
focused on technologica,l performances and the latter, more broadly, on growth patterns). In 
brief, the Nelson-Wright story reconstruct the origins of American leadership, after World War 
I1 tracing it back to 
". . .two conceptually distinct components. There was, first of all, the longstanding strength 
in mass production industries that  grew out of unique conditions of resource abundance and 
large market size. There was, second, a lead in "high technology" industries that  was new and 
stemmed from investment in higher education and in research and development, far surpassing 
the levels of other countries a t  the time" (Nelson and Wright (1992), p. 1960). 
The erosion of that  leadership is then analyzed in terms of the factors which allowed a 
more or less complete technological catching-up by other OECD countries over the last four 
decades (subject to the qualifications put forward by Pate1 and Pavitt (1994) on the long-term 
specificities in the patterns of tech~lological accumulation by individual countries). 
Nelson and Wright do not explicitly talk about the impact of technology on growth, but 
a strong evolutionary conjecture is that innovation and imitation have a major importance in 
explaining both trade patterns and growth patterns (for some empirical tests see Dosi, Pavitt 
and Soete (1990), Verspagen (1993), Amendola et al. (1993), Fagerberg (1994)). Conversely, 
the Aglietta story, directly concerning American (and international) growth patterns, is an 
archetypical application of the Regulation framework sketched above. The conditions for a 
sustained regime of growth are identified into the "virtuous" complementarity (i) mechaniza- 
tion/automation/standardization of production (entailing also ample opportunities for the ex- 
ploitation of economics of scale); (ii) the development of "Fordist" patterns of management 
of industrial relations; (iii) mechanisms of governance of the labour market on the grounds 
of implicit or explicit conventions indexing wages on productivity and consumer prices (with 
the effect, a.nlong others, of smoothing business cycles and sustaining effective demand); (iv) 
symmetrically, relatively stable forms of oligopolistic organisation of product markets (which, 
twined with the above wage dynamics, sustained rather stable patterns of income distribution 
and easy, "accelerator driven", investment planning); (v) the diffusion in consumption of mass 
produced durables; (vi) "Welfare" and "Keynesian" fiscal policies; (vii) the development of an 
international monetary regime conducive to international exchanges (the Bretton Woods setup) 
under the hegemony of one economic and technological leader (the USA). 
Correspondingly, the end of the "Golden Age" following World War I1 is seen as the outcome 
of "mismatched dynamics", for institutional and technological reasons, at  all the foregoing seven 
levels: e.g. the exhaustion of the potential for economies of scale; inflationary pressures amplified 
by the wage formation mechanism; the entry of new competitors destabilizing cosy oligopolis- 
tic arrangements; increasing social conflict favoured by near-full-employment conditions; the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods regime; etc. 
Are these two basic stories essentially two complementary ways of looking at  a broadly 
similar object? But in this case where does the complementarity precisely rest? Or do they 
enta,il competing explanation of the same phenomena? As we shall see, it is our conjecture there 
is a bit of both (and sorting out what is what would be already a significant step ahead ...). 
6 Different Levels of Analysis or Competing Interpretations? 
Certainly, part of the difference in the 'building blocks' of the basic stories outlined above 
relates to  different levels of observation and different primary phenomena to be explained (and 
this of course militates for a would-be complementarity). In many respects, a much greater 
parsimoiliousness on institutional assumptions that one finds in evolutionary models is due to  
the higher level of "historical abstraction" in which they are set. Metaphorically speaking, this is 
the level at  which one investigates the properties of an (imperfect) Invisible ( or  oligopolistically 
visible) Hand operating in presence of the Unbound Prometheus - as David Landes puts it - 
of technological change. In other words, evolutionary models - a t  least the first generation 
of them - start by addressing, in a first approximation, some stylized properties of capitalist 
dyna,mics in general, such as the possibility of self-sustained growth driven by the mistake- 
ridden search by self-seeking agents. Relatedly, the primary objects of interpretation are broad 
statistical regula.rities (or "stylized facts") a t  aggregate level, such as exponential growth, the 
rough constancy of distributive shares, the secular increase in capital/labour ratios, the degrees 
of persistency in macro fluctuations and more generally the spectral density of time series; the 
broad patterns of divergence/convergence of per capita income in the world economy; etc. (see 
Nelson and Winter (1982), Dosi, Fabiani, Aversi and Meacci (1994)) Silverberg and Verspagen 
(1994) and the - far too modest! - overview in Silverberg and Verspagen (1995)). Similarly, 
a t  'meso' level - i.e. that  of single industries - evolutionary models have proved to  be quite 
capable of interpreting statistical phenomena such as skewed size distributions of firms by size, 
'life cycle' patterns of evolution, inter-sectoral differences in industrial structures grounded in 
different 'technological regimes', etc. (cf. Dosi et al. (1995)). 
With respect to  this level of observation, in many ways, the degree of abstraction of Regula- 
tion theories is much lower and the interpretative ambition is higher, in the sense that  the aim 
goes well beyond the account of broad statistical invariances but points at  the understanding 
of discrcte forms of development and the transitions across them. Relatedly, the degrees of 
iilstitutional specification is bound to  be much higher and, as it happens, the 'microfoundations' 
much more implicit (when they are there a t  all). 
So, yes, we have here a potentially fruitful complementarity concerning two different levels of 
description (see also below). As we see i t ,  the aggregate functional and institutional regularities 
which are the starting point of most Regulatioiz  model^,^ could possibly be shown to  be emergent 
properties of an underlying, explicitly microfounded, evolutionary models, appropriately enriched 
in their institutional specifications. 
Take for example the Verdoorn-Kaldor functional form relating productivity growth and in- 
come growth which is postulated in Regulation models. Evolutionary models are in principle 
suited to  establish the microeconomic conditions under which it emerges in the aggregate as a 
stable relation: e.g. what are the micro-learning processes that  sustain it? What happens t o  
its form and parametrizations if one varies the underlying mechanisms of search and sources of 
tecl~nological opportunities? Under what circumstances can one identify phenomena of 'symme- 
try breaking' engendered by microfluctuations and yielding the transition t o  different structural 
forms? 
Similarly, with respect to  wage formation mechanisms. Again, the 'structural forms' in the 
Regulation account tend to postulate aggregate invariances, say in the elasticities of wages to 
unemployment, prices and productivity. Conversely, evolutionary-inspired models of the labour 
market and labour processes (still t o  be built!) might well account for the conditions of their 
enlergence, stability and crises. And the same could be said for most other 'primary building 
blocks' of Regulation models. 
Of course we do not want to push the 'emergence philosophy' too far. It  would be naive t o  
think that straightforward links between levels of description can be made without resorting to  
a lot of further 'phenomenological', history-based, specifications. Jokingly, we illustrate all this 
with the parable of the cow (!). If anyone is asked to  describe what a cow is, it would be silly 
to  start from a quantum mechanics account of the atoms composing it,  and then move on to  
the levels of atoms, molecules, cells . . .all the way to  the morpl~ological description of the cow. 
However, the example is handy because it illustrate, first, the consistency in principle between 
the different levels of description; second, the fact that a good deal of higher level properties (e.g. 
concerning cells' self-maintenance) can be understood as emerging properties from lower level 
'Note that  we do not mean only formal, mathematically expressed, 'models', but also rigorous, albeit verbally 
expressed, theory-based propositions about whatever phenomena. 
dynamics; and, third, that  without a lot of additional 'phenomenological' information, generic 
emergent properties are not enough to  determine why that  animal is a cow and not an elephant 
or a bird . . . 
Admittedly, in economics we are very far from such a consistency across levels of descriptions 
(and certainly the compression to  one single a-historical level that  the neoclassical tradition 
has taught us did not help . . . ). However, we want to  suggest that a theory-informed dialogue 
between bottom-up (microfounded, etc.) evolutionary approaches and more top-down (aggregate, 
albeit institutionally richer) regulation ones is likely to  be a formidable but analytically promising 
c l ~ a l l e n ~ e . ~  Not only it would help to  rigorously define the bridges between micro behaviours 
and entities at  different levels of aggregation, but it would also highlight potential conflicts of 
interpretations which are currently often confused by level-of-description issues. Having said 
that ,  few unresolved questions and areas of possible conflict come already to mind. 
The Descriptive Counterparts of Socio-Economic Regimes. 
We have already mentioned earlier that ,  in a sense, the Regulation approach sets to itself the 
ambitious task of dissecting the anatomy of discrete regimes of growth. But then, it seems to  
us, a uilavoidable task is the empirical, and also statistical, identification of these regimes. Some 
work has been done in this direction, especially concerning long-term wage dynamics, but also 
labour productivity and demand formation (for surveys, see chapter 10 by C. Leroy, chapter 22 
by M. Juillard, chapter 23 by B. Amable in Boyer and Saillard (1995) and also Boyer (1988b)). 
However, a lot remains to  be done - as difficult as it is. For example, if phases of development 
and crises are traced back to  the properties of underlying regimes, how is it revealed by the 
dynamics of statistical aggregates? And, which ones? And a t  which level of aggregation? (e.g. 
amre GDP series too noisy and unprecise so that  one should look at  sectoral data?) Or is one 
forced to  the conclusion that  current econometric methods are ill-suited to  detect changes which 
appear very important when inspecting qualitatively 'how the economy works', but are blurred 
by statistical noise in the reported series? 
Notably, an answer to  these questions will help a lot in pinning down the common objects 
of interpretation (and also in revealing the comparative merits of an institutionalist approach 
to  macroeconomics as compared to more traditional ones). Moreover, a crucial part of the 
regulutionist exercise involves the mapping of socio-economic regimes into dynamic properties 
of the system. But then a lot more work is required to  find statistical proxies for those regimes 
7Broad historical interpretations building upon a lato sensu evolutionary microeconomics, such as Freeman 
and Perez (1988), might be considered as another point of departure of this dialogue. 
themselves (this mirrors the effort that  scholars in the evolutionary tradition have started putting 
into the statistical identification of 'technological regimes'; cf. Malerba and Orsenigo (1994)). 
The Institutional Specifications of Evolutionary Model 
In a sort of complementary way, in order to start talking about (roughly) the same things, it 
is urgent that a new generation of evolutionary models begins experimenting systematically with 
variations in the institutional contexts in which evolutionary processes are embedded. One can 
think of different ways of doing it (corresponding also to different degrees of difficulty). First, 
holding constant the system parameters, concerning e.g. notional technological opportunities, 
one may ask what happens to  aggregate dynamics if one changes behavioural routines (an early 
example is in Chiaromonte, Dosi and Orsenigo (1992), and the constraints on those routines 
themselves (well expanding upon the exercise of Nelson and Winter (1982) regarding different 
financial constraints on borrowed funds). Second, even holding routines constant, one should 
experiment with different interaction environments (e.g. centralized vs. pairwise forms of in- 
teraction; price-based competition vs. selection based on multidimensional product attributes; 
bank-based vs. market-based access to finance; etc.). In fact a major claim of both evolutionary 
and regulation theories is that  markets are themselves institutional constructions whose organi- 
sational details deeply affect collective outcomes. However one knows very little of how markets 
actually works and even less so one has taxonomies of sort of 'archetypes' of markets which can 
thereafter be stylized and formally explored. Third, one might allow for routines themselves to  
be learned in different institutional environmentsg That would imply, in turn, the identification 
of distinct learning procedures in different environments. Fourth, (and harder), it might be time 
to  explore in an evolutionary perspective other domains of economic activity (e.g. the labour 
market, financial markets, the endogenous dynamics of consumer preferences, etc.) 
Some Possible Misunderstandings: Microfoundations, Representative Agents and Method- 
'A noticeable esception is Kirman (xx) on the fish market in Marseille (!!) 
'A simple adaptive learning mechanism nested in a macro model is presented in Silverberg and Verspagen 
(1995a). Much more 'constructive' models of behavioural learning are in Marengo (1992), Marengo and Tordjman 
(1995) and Dosi e t  al. (1994), but they are far from any macro model. Moreover, they, too, lack experiments on 
different institutional specification. 
Note that  here, by routines we specifically mean those rules-of-thumb concerning e.g. pricing, R&D, investments, 
etc. It is a fundamental point of evolutionary theories that different techniques are intimately associated also 
with different prodz~ctzon routiries. And, indeed, the models provide a representation of the dynamics of the latter 
via a low-dimensional representation of search outcomes in the technology space. However, a major step forward 
would be an explicit account of the dynamics of the underlying problem-solving routines (see also below). 
ological Individualism . . . 
In the argument so far, an implicit assumption has been that  the degrees of "bottomupness" 
or "topdownness" (including the presence and details of interactions among lower-level entities 
cum emergence of higher-level properties) is essentially conditional on the levels and modes of 
description themselves. 
So, for example, we do not have any prblem in acknowledging the descriptive power of, say, 
the now-discredited Keynesian "income multipliers", as a concise way of accounting - under 
historical conditions to  be specified - for a specific relationship between modal behaviours of 
"firms" and "consumers". In turn, such an aggregate description implies, of course, that func- 
tional roles in society count. (Here there should be little disagreement between the evolutionary 
and regulation approaches). The underlying idea is that  an economic agent, Mr. Jones - even 
when he is at  the same time worker a t  factory x, shareholder of company y which owns that  
factory, and coilsumer of the products of that  factory and of many other ones - will behave 
according to  modal patterns deriving from an institution-shaped logic of appropriateness, as 
James March puts it (how should Jones, as a consumer or as a worker behave? . . .). Most 
likely what Mr. Jones does as a worker ought to  be interpreted on the grounds of the collective 
history of many Mr. Jones's, their experiences a t  the workplace, their successes and failures in 
industrial bargaining, etc. Analogously, the same should apply to his behaviour as a consumer 
or a shareholder . . .The basic point here is that a reduction of Mr. Jones' behaviour to  a co- 
herent exercise of utility maximization in a largely institution-free environment misses the point 
and is interpretatively misleading or, a t  best, void of any descriptive content. Mr. Jones might 
for example feel safe to  buy shares of very conservative companies in order to ensure a rosy 
retirement age, fight in the meantime on the workplace against the very practices that  these 
same companies try to implement, and buy Japanese products even when that  endanger the 
wealth possibly stemming from the companies whose shares he bought.. . 
Having said that ,  however, it seems to us that  the hypothesis of institutional embeddedness 
of social behaviours - largely shared by the evolutionary and regulationist approaches - cannot 
be pushed to the dangerous borders of some renewed functionalism. There is some echo of all 
that  when one finds a too cavalier use of sorts of "functional representative agents" in regula- 
tionist int,erpretations (" . . . the behaviour of the Fordist firm", "the unionized worker"; etc.). 
If anything, those stylized behavioural archetypes ought to be considered as rough first cipproz- 
imations, demanding further investigations into their microfoundations and the conditions of 
their sustainability over time. For example, under what context conditions will the behaviours 
of many Mr. Jones's (or, for that matter, of many firms.'Jones Inc.' . . . )  remain relatively 
invariant over time? What are the conditions on interactions and statistical aggregation which 
sustain relatively invariant mean behaviours? And, conversely, under what circumstances do 
non-average behaviours induce symmetry-breaking and, possibly, phase transitions? (Note that  
this last issue is particularly relevant when accounting for the dynamics across different regimes). 
Certainly, we share Boyer and Saillard's general conjecture that  
". . . a  mode of regulation elicits a set of procedures and individual and collective be- 
haviours which ought a t  the same time reproduce [particular] social relations . . . and 
sustain the prevailing regime of accumulation. Moreover, a mode of regulation must 
assures the compatibility among a collection of decentralized decisions, without nec- 
essarily requiring the acknowledgement by the agents of the principles which govern 
the dynamics of the system as a whole" (Boyer and Saillard (1995)) p. 64, our 
translation). 
Work to  support this claim (at  both levels of empirical investigations and formal modeling) 
is urgently needed, and, in our view is also another area of fruitful complementarity between 
'evolutionists' and 'regulationist s'. 
In this respect, a possible misunderstanding has to  be dispelled. The requirement of micro- 
foundations of aggregate statements (i.e. foundations in what actually a multitude of agents 
do and, possibly, think), which we have emphasized throughout this work, must not at  all be 
considered equivalent to  any advocacy for foundations into any "methodological individualism". 
The latter, in its cailonic form, requires that any collective state of the system first, ought to be 
explained on the grounds of what people contributing with their actions to  determine that  state 
think and do; and second, that  these micro "thoughts", strategies and actions are the primitives 
of the theory. Our claim is much weaker. We share, in principle, the first requirement,'' but we 
strongly deny the second. So for example, we are perfectly happy with 'microfoundations' which 
are themselves macrofounded, i.e. whereby what 'people think and do' is deeply but imperfectly 
shaped by the organisation and states of the system itself. 
As an illustration consider the following toy model. Take a competitive world (as similar as 
10 7 f i e  also want to emphasize the fact that  we share the requirement i n  principle ,  even if it might turn out that  
in many circumstances that link micro-macro turns out to be practically impossible. It  is a circunlstance familiar 
also to natural sciences where it is often the case that one can write the aggregate statistical properties (say, in a 
therinodynamic problem) without being able to derive them from an underlying micro description (say, detailed 
balance equations). 
possible to a Temporary General Equilibrium, of pure exchange - in order to  make things simple). 
Suppose the state of the system, s(0) a t  time t(0) is defined by a price vector p(0) and allocations 
w;(O) to each agent i. As usual, given prices and allocations, preference relations will determine 
the demand functions. If we specify a mechanism of exchange (which indeed the theory seldom 
does) well-defined transition laws to  p ( l ) ,p (2 ) .  . . and R(1), R(2).  . . (the subsequent allocations). 
This is obviously a microfounded story. However, add to the story that  the preference relations 
themselves depend, imperfectly, on the lagged p(.) and R(-) ,  for example, because of phenomena 
of reduction of cognitive dissonance (". . .don't desire what you were not able to  get . . . "), social 
imitation, learning-how-to-like-what-you-have, etc. In this case, we still have a microfounded 
story, but of course a )  individual preferences stop being a 'primitive' of the explanation, and, b) 
we have here a sort of "macrofoundation of the micro", in the sense that  what micro entities do 
is to a good extent determined by the collective history of the system itself". This metaphor, 
we suggest, is of wide applicability, well-beyond the foregoing caricatural example. 
A Crossroad for Dialogue (or Conflict): The Nature of Economic Routines 
We have mentioned earlier that both evolutionary and regulation approaches share the idea 
that  a good deal of individual and collective behaviours are "boundedly rational", context- 
dependent and relatively inertial over time - shaped as they are by equally inertial institutions 
in which they are embedded. In a word, both approaches share the view that  a good deal 
of the reproduction of the socio-economic fabric rests on the development and implementation 
of organisationcil routines. However, as we discuss a t  much greater in Coriat and Dosi (1995) 
most organisational routines entail a double nature: on the one hand, they store and reproduce 
problem-solving competences, while, a t  the same time, they are also mechanism of governance 
of potentially conflictual relations. 
As it happens, the evolutionary approach has focussed almost exclusively on the 'cognitive' 
aspects of routiiles (and by doing that has begun to  open interesting avenues of dialogue with 
disciplines like cognitive psychology and artificial sciences), but it has largely neglected the 
dimensions of power and control intertwined into the routines themselves12. 
Almost the symmetric opposite applies to the regulation approach which has tended to  
"We have repeatedly underlined the imperfect adaptation of agents to the macro configurations of the system. 
A perfect adaptation would indeed imply a strong functionalist conjecture (". . .people do and think what they 
are supposed t,o do, given the functional requirements of the system itself . . . "). In our view, on the contrary, it 
is precisely imperfect adaptation which is an important source of dynamics. 
"This notwithstanding the acknowledgement of their importance: cf. for example, Nelson and Winter's defini- 
tion of "routines as truces" among conflicting interests (Nelson and IYinter (1982)) 
emphasize the requirements of social coherence implied by routines, but has not paid much 
attention to their knowledge content. 
All this might be all right again as a first approximation but it is clearly unsatisfactory as an 
end result in either approach. Pushing it to  the extreme, in the former perspective, an  answer 
to  the question of "how do Renault (or GM or United Biscuits . . . )  behaves" is inclined to 
account for operating procedures, mechanisms of knowledge accumulation, learning strategies, 
etc. leaving in the background phenomena like the conflict between different social groups, 
the links that  particular organisational rules bear with income distribution and the exercise 
of power (well beyond their knowledge content), etc. Conversely, the regulationist answer, by 
putting most of the emphasis on the latter phenomena, tends to convey the idea that governance 
is the paramount role of routines, quite irrespectively of the fact that  Renault or GM have to 
know how to  produce cars and United Biscuit cakes, and they have got to do it well, and better 
over time . . .The risks of one-sided accounts are particularly big when accounting for the origins 
of routines themselves, with an evolutionary inclination to trace them back to cognitive dynamics 
only, and the regulationists feeling a bit too comfortable with a reduction of the problem to  a 
selection dynamics among well-specified menus of actions/strategies/conventions.13 
We argue in Coriat and Dosi (1995) that the double nature of routines, and relatedly the 
double marks on their origins, are challenging points of encounter between the evolutionist and 
institutionalist research programmes. Or, conversely, it could be the crossroad where the former 
take some sort of 'hypercognitive' route, whereby microeconomics and cognitive psychology tend 
to simply merge, and regulationists could well discover that  'methodological individualism7 and 
weaker forms of 'neo-institutionalism7 (cf. Table I) are not so bad after all . . . 
13 In turn, as known, once the problem is posed in these terms it can be formally handled by means of e.g. 
"evolutionary games" (cf. Boyer and Orlean (1992) for such an attempt).  Far from denying the usefulness of 
such exercises as sorts of gedankenexperiment on collective adaptation under potential conflict of interests (or 
conflicts between individual incentives and collective good), they still deliver a quite partial picture of the object 
of inquiry. . . For example, in the current state-of-the-art we do not know of any model allowing for adaptation 
on preferences themselves (i.e. in game terms, endogenously evolving payoff matrices). Neither there is the 
discovery of new "strategies" (with the exception of Lindgren (xx)). And finally, 'learning' tends to  neglect any 
cognitive/problem-solving aspect and be reduced to a stimulus-response mechanism of reinforcement (possibly 
mitigated by stochastic search or mistakes). 
7 Some Conclusions: Toward A Demanding and 
Exciting Interbreeding? 
Notwithstanding a series of important analytical issues - which might indeed be a source of 
serious interpretative conflict, and of which we have provided some illustrations - we do see an  
ideal sequence of modes of interpretation and levels of description in which both the evolutionist 
and regulationist programmes could ambitiously fit. As sketched in Table 2, they run from 
a sort of 'nano-economics', wherein the abandonment of any magic of a perfect and invariant 
rationality forces a dialogue with cognitive and social psychology, organization theory, sociology, 
all the way to  grand historical conjectures on the long term destinies of contemporary forms 
of socio-economic organisation. Even a quick look a t  the table highlights the enormous gaps 
between what we now and what such an  ideal evolutionary-institutionalist research programme 
would demand. These gaps are high a t  all levels but in our view four issues are particularly 
urgent on the agenda. 
A first one concerns co-evolutionary processes. The  essence of the co-evolutionary point is 
t ha t  what happens in each partly autonomous domain of the system (e.g. technology or insti- 
tutioilal structures) shapes and constrains what is going to  happen in the other ones. Hence, 
the overall dynamics is determined by the ways each domain evolves but also by the  ways the  
various domains are coupled with each other.14 We have listed "co-evolution" under a separate 
level of description in order t o  demarcate tha t  broad area covering e.g. the interactions between 
the forms of economic organisation, social and political institutions and technical change. How- 
ever, co-evolutionary issues appear a t  all levels of description. For example, the emergence and 
development of each industry ought t o  be seen as a co-evolutionary process between technologies 
corporate organisations and supporting institutions (Nelson (1994)). Analogously, the origins 
of organisational routines (cf. above) is intimately a co-evolutionary process, shaped by diverse 
and probably conflicting selection criteria (i.e. problem-solving vs. governance requirements). 
A second (and related) item which is high on the research agenda regards the transition across 
rliflerent socio-economic regimes of growth: for example, a t  which level can such transitions be 
1 4  A co-evolutiouary view runs against, for example, "technological determinism" (i.e. technology proceeds 
exclusively according to its inner logics, and institutions ought simply t o  adjust, with varying lags) but also to  
"social determinism" (e.g. technology is purely a "social construction"). On the contrary, the co-evolutionary 
view does accept that  technological change and social change have their own inner logics (possibly conflicting 
with each other) and does attempt to  explain e.g. the emerging trajectories of technical change as the outcome 
of such a coupling. 
Table 2. Levels of Analysis. 
Objects of analysis Examples of 
(some still t o  be explored) "analytical styles" 
Level 0 From "macroeconomics" to  (i) Nature and origins of routines and,  generally, From H.Simon t o  Holland et  al. (1986) microanalytic part 
microeconomics 1,ehavioural norms of Nelson and Winter (1982); Cohen and Bacdayan 
(ii) Learning processes (1994); Egidi (1994); organisational economics on 
(iii) Mechanisms of expectation formation "competences" , etc.; Coriat (1994a); Dosi et al. (1994); 
(iv) Nature and evolution of micro organizations (e.g. Marengo (1992); Warglien (1995); Marengo and Tordjman (1995); possible economic applications of Fontana and business firms) Buss (1994); and a lot to be done ... (v) 'Embedding' mechanisms of individual behaviours 
. . 
into the institutional context 
(vi) The evolution of criteria of actions and 'visions of 
the  world' 




Level 2 Aggregate dynamics 
Level 3 "Co-evolution" . . . 
(i) Generic properties of growth fuelled by technical Explicit microfounded models with aggregate emergent 
change statistical properties: 
(ii) Industrial evolution e.g. Nelson and Winter (1982); Silverberg and Verspagen 
(iii) Self-organizing properties of labour markets (1994); Lesourne (199 1) Dosi et  al. (1995) 
(iv) The dynamics of consumption patterns 
(i) Functional relations among aggregate variables More 'stylized' but  (hopefully) institutionally richer macro 
(ii) Socio-economic regimes: consistency conditions models (not necessarily microfounded): 
among processes of economic adjustment and from KeynesianIKaldorian models to  Boyer (1988a/b) ... 
institutions Gordon (1994); Silverberg (1987) 
(i) Co-evolutionary patterns between teclinologies, . . . A lot of appreciative theorizing from historians. . . 
corporate organizations and broader institutions relatively little modeling (but cf. the suggestion in Nelson 
(ii) C o u ~ l e d  institutional dvnamics.. . (1994) on industrial dynamics). . . \ I  1
(iii) (Political discretionality, and institutional inertias a vast regulation-inspired empirical literature (cf. Boyer 
and Saillard (1995)) 
Level 4 "Grand history" General interpretative conjectures on long-term historical . . . from Karl Marx to . . . Schumpeter.. . t o  Freeman and 
patterns . . . Perez (1988) . . . t o  Aglietta (1982) and Boyer and Mistral 
(1978) (just t o  name the perspectives discussed in this 
work) . . . !! 
detected? (which probably will be conditional on the type of transition one is talking about). 
What are the effects of "higher level" changes (e.g. in the institutional set-ups or in the policy 
environment) upon micro-economic behaviour? And, conversely, under what circumstances 
non-average micro-behaviours become 'autocatalytic' and eventually induce higher-lee1 phase 
transitions? What kind of co-evolutionary processes do particular classes of transitions entail?; 
etc. 
A third priority item, in our view, concerns what could be called, in a shorthand, the relation- 
ships between emergence and embeddedness, or, putting it another way, the role of "bottom-up" 
processes shaping/generating higher-level entities (or at  least aggregate statistical patterns) vs. 
"top-down" processes by which higher level entities (e.g. institutions, established mechanisms 
of interaction, etc.) shapelgenerate 'lower level' behaviours. One of the claims underlying this 
whole paper is that  the links work both ways and that one ought to  account for "macrofounda- 
tion of the micro" as well as "microfoundations of the macro" . . .But how does one get beyond 
suggestive metaphors and elaborates more rigorous - albeit highly simplified - models which 
nonetheless capture the intuition? (Note that  what we mean is something more than a feed- 
back between a system-level state variable - say, a price or a market share -, and the argument 
of an individual decision algorithm - say, pricing or investment rules -: somewhat deeper, we 
think it is not beyond reach to  develop models whereby micro decision algorithms themselves 
are shaped by macro states and, conversely, possibly non-linear interactions among the former 
cha.nge collective interaction rules/constraints/perceived payoffslperceived opportunities . . . ). 
But in turn, all this involves difficult issues concerning, again, coordination; relative time-scales 
of change; relative invariances of 'structures' and conditions of their stability . . . . 
Fourth, we suggest that  the nature of learning processes, too, ought t o  deserve a prior- 
ity attention. As Lundvall emphasizes (in this volume) the objects of learning ("know what", 
"know why", "know how", "know who" . . .) are likely to discriminate among classes of learning 
processes. And, certainly, the competence gap between the intrinsic complexity of any one cog- 
nitionldecision problem a t  hand and the pre-existing abilities of (individual or collective) agents 
fundamentally shapes learning processes (for a discussion, cf. Dosi and Egidi (1991)). But, in 
turn, it is only a weird twist of contemporary economic thought that  gives credibility to the 
idea that  increnlentalist procedures, either based on sophisticated hypothesis testing (such as 
in Bayesian models) or stimulus-response reinforcements are the general paradigm of learning 
(note that  this applies to  'evolutionary games', but also to  most evolutionary models in general) 
that one has developed so far.15 
As a way forward, we suggest, possibly building upon preliminary (and still very rudimen- 
tary) attempts by e.g. Marengo (1992), Egidi (1994), Cohen and Bacdayan (1994), Marengo 
and Tordjman (1995) and also Dosi et al. (1994), a priority task is to account for the formation 
and collective establishment of cognitive categories, problem-solving procedures ( . . .routines ?? 
. . . ) and expectations about the identities and behaviours of other social axtors . . . l6 
Yes, all this is an enormous task. Very fascinating and extremely difficult. The way we see it 
pursued, it involves tight and troublesome interchanges between empirical investigations, "ap- 
preciative theorizing" and formal modeling efforts. It is likely to  involve also major adjustments 
in the building blocks of institutionalist/evolutionary theories themselves. 
Probably, we witness now a rare window of opportunity for fulfilling the promise of making 
economics an "evolutionary/institutionalist discipline". The blame for failing to  do so will fall 
mainly on ourselves, well before the sectarian attitudes of chair committees or international 
jour~lal editors . . . 
151ncidentally, "Bayesian" and "Pavlovian" learning have most characteristics in common since both claim (i) 
what Sarage would have called a "small world" hypothesis (the notional set of events and response strategies is 
given from the s tar t ) ;  and (ii) there is a striking transparence of the links between actions and consequences. 
Hence, ultimately, the difference between the two just rests on what the theorist assumes the agent to  consciously 
know, without much influence on the ultimate outcomes. So, for example, it is easy for biologists overwhelmed by 
ecoiiomists' fascination to build models of rats who behave in equilibrium "as . . .if" understanding strategies in- 
volving first-order conditions and Lagrange multipliers, or conversely, respectable economists claiming 'Pavlovian' 
convergence to  sophisticated Rational Expectation equilibria. 
''By way of a comparison, recall that even in the most sophisticated state-of-the-art accounts, in economics, 
of behaviours and interactions (even under conditions of imperfect information) agents are assumed to obviously 
have the correct 'transparent' understanding of the causal links of the environment, to  obviously know how to 
solve the technical problems a t  hand . . . 
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